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The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and Airland Battle by [Robert Leonhard]

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Robert R. Leonhard

The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and Airland Battle Kindle Edition

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The Art of Maneuver shows how true maneuver-warfare theory has been applied in campaigns throughout history. With a genius for apt analogy the author shows how our obsession with fighting and winning set-piece battles causes us to overlook an enemy’s true vulnerabilities. But as low-intensity conflicts promise to become the dominant warfare of the future, the importance of maneuver in attacking an enemy’s critical vulnerability will render attrition approaches to warfighting ever more obsolete.

Praise for The Art of Maneuver

“Robert Leonhard is one of a number of prominent young military writers, like Daniel Bolger, John Antal, Bruce Gudmundsson, and Harold Raugh, whose work appears regularly in military journals. The Art of Maneuver is his first book, and military readers will appreciate his grasp of military history, forceful analysis, and adventurous writing style. . . .This is an important book which deserves the attention of military professionals. . . . Leonhard deserves credit for a hard-nosed attempt to evaluate U.S. strengths and weaknesses as a basis for further improvements in service doctrine, training, and force development. . . . In the celebratory aftermath of a ‘good war,’ such honest self-appraisal is both healthy and encouraging.”—Parameters

“This commentary on warfighting is of value to any student of warfare, especially with our current emphasis on the importance of joint and combined operations. . . . This is an intelligent, thorough, and well-researched work. The author’s knowledge is demonstrated amply throughout, and his ability to express maneuver warfare concepts in simple terms is unequaled. . . . An important milestone in the evolution of the maneuver style of warfare. Read it!”—Marine Corps Gazette

“Leonhard . . . has combined military expertise and historical analysis for an entertaining and fresh look at maneuver warfare. . . . In one volume, the author offers trenchant, exciting, and masterful perspective on victory in modern warfare.”—National Defense

“Robert Leonhard makes an outstanding contribution to our understanding of maneuver warfare in this book. . . . Our leaders, junior and senior alike, should find this book well worth reading and contemplating.”—ARMOR Magazine

“An important contribution to the on-going reassessment of U.S. Army doctrine . . . A must for anyone seriously interested in the future of Army doctrine—and the Army. . . . Further, it is an excellent starting point for young officers to begin their lifelong study of the art of war.”—ARMY Magazine

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328 pages
Language

English
Publisher

Presidio Press
Publication date

January 16, 2009
File size

4859 KB
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Editorial Reviews

Review

“Robert Leonhard is one of a number of prominent young military writers, like Daniel Bolger, John Antal, Bruce Gudmundsson, and Harold Raugh, whose work appears regularly in military journals. The Art of Maneuver is his first book, and military readers will appreciate his grasp of military history, forceful analysis, and adventurous writing style. . . .This is an important book which deserves the attention of military professionals. . . . Leonhard deserves credit for a hard-nosed attempt to evaluate U.S. strengths and weaknesses as a basis for further improvements in service doctrine, training, and force development. . . . In the celebratory aftermath of a ‘good war,’ such honest self-appraisal is both healthy and encouraging.”—Parameters

“This commentary on warfighting is of value to any student of warfare, especially with our current emphasis on the importance of joint and combined operations. . . . This is an intelligent, thorough, and well-researched work. The author’s knowledge is demonstrated amply throughout, and his ability to express maneuver warfare concepts in simple terms is unequaled. . . . An important milestone in the evolution of the maneuver style of warfare. Read it!”—Marine Corps Gazette

“Leonhard . . . has combined military expertise and historical analysis for an entertaining and fresh look at maneuver warfare. . . . In one volume, the author offers trenchant, exciting, and masterful perspective on victory in modern warfare.”—National Defense

“Robert Leonhard makes an outstanding contribution to our understanding of maneuver warfare in this book. . . . Our leaders, junior and senior alike, should find this book well worth reading and contemplating.”—ARMOR Magazine

“An important contribution to the on-going reassessment of U.S. Army doctrine . . . A must for anyone seriously interested in the future of Army doctrine—and the Army. . . . Further, it is an excellent starting point for young officers to begin their lifelong study of the art of war.”—ARMY Magazine

About the Author

Robert Leonhard is an active duty army officer currently serving as Professor of Military Science at West Virginia University. He is the author of The Principles of War for the Information Age, The Art of Maneuver, and Fighting by Minutes. He lives in Morgantown, West Virginia. --This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.

Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

CHAPTER 1

FRAMEWORK FOR MANEUVER
The best strategy is always to be very strong.
—Clausewitz, On War

INTRODUCTION: THE FLOWERY WARS

The ancient Aztecs worshiped, among others, Huitzicoatl, the storm god. One of the most important aspects of their worship was to provide Huitzicoatl with his favorite nectar—human blood. In order to satisfy the god’s grisly thirst, the Aztecs employed a ritualistic method of fighting other tribes known as “the flowery wars.”1 The purpose behind the flowery wars was not simply defeat of the enemy per se; the Aztecs were motivated to glorify and focus upon the bloodshed that resulted from battle. If possible the enemy was not killed outright but rather captured, so that later his heart could be ritually cut out and offered to Huitzicoatl. And since all participants basically worshiped the same gods and viewed the flowery wars from the same perspective, there was a sort of cooperation, rather than competition, associated with the fighting. Once challenge had been officially offered, both sides’ priests would meet to arrange for battle on the most auspicious day. Each side was meticulous about giving the enemy the best opportunity to prepare for the battle. It was unthinkable to concentrate instead upon defeating the enemy, imposing one’s will through force of arms, and ending the fight on favorable terms at the least expense of men, materiel, and time. To win and win cheaply would have been regarded as blasphemy—selfishly withholding the proper blood sacrifice.

Thankfully, Huitzicoatl is dead—or is he? Can we perhaps detect his sanguinary presence in our army today? Can we track his bloody footprints along the halls of our training institutions? Do we hear his priests chanting as we listen to the latest versions of our fighting doctrine being preached? Whether for the sake of deities, doctrinaires, or just grand old traditions, there appears to be an immovable fixation upon attrition theory within the U.S. Army, at times approaching the madness of the Aztecs’ flowery wars in its application. The priorities found in doctrinal manuals, in schools, in combat units, and most important, in the souls of our leaders often appear to be aimed at destroying rather than defeating, at fighting fairly rather than stealing every possible advantage over the enemy, and at pursuing perfection in method rather than obtaining decisive results. Virtually every effort—whether designing new vehicles, improving weapons or munitions, developing new tactical concepts, or training officers—seems bent on fighting toe-to-toe with a prepared enemy, leaning into his strength, and outlasting him rather than outthinking him.

This book is aimed at investigating these trends: defining them, exposing their weaknesses, and breaking the cognitive logjam that threatens to block creative approaches to developing effective fighting doctrine. There is a wealth of innovation and energy within our combat-arms leaders that will never be channeled effectively under the constraints imposed by our current doctrine and institutionalized inertia. This study is designed to offer some new thoughts and to inject new directions in our doctrinal developments. To accomplish this task in a way that is at once accurate, inspiring, interesting (even entertaining), and—most of all—useful to friends and foes of the concept alike, I have attempted to define the term “maneuver warfare,” compare it to its theoretical antithesis (attrition theory), and then evaluate our current and evolving doctrine in the light of maneuver theory.

THE CHALLENGE TO DEFINE

When Antoine-Henri Jomini wrote his Art of War, he came under attack by his contemporaries for his presumptuous dogmatism. His attempts to provide concrete and useful definitions and concepts of military theory enraged many of his peers. In reply he wrote:

I hope … I could not be accused of wishing to make this art a mechanical routine, nor of pretending on the contrary that the reading of a single chapter of principles is able to give, all at once, the talent of conducting an army. In all the arts, as in all the situations of life, knowledge and skill are two altogether different things, and if one often succeed through skill alone, it is never but the union of the two that constitutes a superior man and assures complete success.

It seems that throughout all walks of life, and particularly within the military profession, there persists a dislike, even a fear, of definitions. Whether because a clear definition of a term or concept immediately begs questions about the exception, or because Western man’s love of pluralism causes him to be wary of dogma, one finds that to define a military term is to create an argument. Within the U.S. Army there seems to be a recurring trend first to organize, categorize, and lend specificity to the field manuals and other publications that articulate our doctrine, and then to retreat from such assertions in the name of encouraging innovative thinking. I recall the sense of frustration I had as a young infantry lieutenant, hungry for knowledge but unable to find anything substantial in my “how-to-fight” field manuals beyond vague generalities and buzzwords that left me unprepared for the complexities of mechanized operations. Then again, as a captain I was pleased to find revised manuals that offered well-organized, specific tactical procedures for small units. I have observed the cycle continue ever since: an attempt to articulate specific and useful ideas followed by a cautious retreat into vagueness.

But without some established definitions and principles, a journey into military theory is impossible. Therefore, this chapter is devoted to defining terms and concepts to be used throughout the remainder of the book. We shall progress in the course of four chapters to the objective of specifying from the perspective of both military history and modern theory what the term “maneuver warfare” means and what it doesn’t mean. It is necessary to prepare for our examination of the subject by first establishing a framework for discussion. I have drawn upon many sources for this chapter, and in some instances I will suggest some new ideas. --This text refers to an alternate kindle_edition edition.

Product details

ASIN ‏ : ‎ B001QAP3JG
Publisher ‏ : ‎ Presidio Press (January 16, 2009)
Publication date ‏ : ‎ January 16, 2009
Language ‏ : ‎ English
File size ‏ : ‎ 4859 KB
Text-to-Speech ‏ : ‎ Enabled
Screen Reader ‏ : ‎ Supported
Enhanced typesetting ‏ : ‎ Enabled
X-Ray ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled
Word Wise ‏ : ‎ Enabled
Print length ‏ : ‎ 328 pages
Page numbers source ISBN ‏ : ‎ 0891415327
Lending ‏ : ‎ Not Enabled

Best Sellers Rank: #635,613 in Kindle Store (See Top 100 in Kindle Store)
- #585 in Military Strategy History (Kindle Store)
- #2,028 in Military Strategy History (Books)
- #2,537 in Business Leadership

Customer Reviews:
57 ratings

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Robert R. Leonhard

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Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Robert Leonhard served in the US Army for 24 years as an infantry officer, combat developer, and war planner. Currently he serves on the principal professional staff of The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in Laurel, Maryland as a research analyst specializing in irregular warfare.

Colonel Leonhard earned a BA in History from Columbus University, a Masters in International Relations from Troy State University, a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences from the US Army Command and General Staff College, and a Doctorate in American History from West Virginia University.

He lives in West Virginia with his wife, the novelist Suzanne Elizabeth Leonhard, and their children. He is an avid wargamer and chess player.

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1 star		4%

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czz

Well tried, I'd say

Reviewed in the United States on February 6, 2019

Verified Purchase

So many things are wrong with this book. I just can't address them all. I'm not sure I learned anything. I was mostly frustrated reading it. I disagree with its premise. I don't want to review it. Other books are at least as good and of further reaching implications. Maybe someone else can properly review this thing. I just felt like we weren't talking about anything, we were just thinking about other peoples thoughts and we relied on a lot of feelings about words, like movement is better than stagnant as far as how we feel about words. I'd rather be described and moving than stuck. But I'm not sure there is any question to answer or a problem to solve or a tactic to improve. Not an engaging read either. Although, not the worst by far. I certainly wouldn't fault someone trying to read it. But I would be cautious of anyone treating it in high regard.

One person found this helpful

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D.K

Must Read!

Reviewed in the United States on August 3, 2021

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This book teaches principles that can be applied to everything in life. Using combat analogies you can apply this book to everything you do in life if you really dive deep into this. Recommend reading it once normally and then go back and really spend time annotating to get the most out of this book. Although, if you haven't read Extreme Ownership I suggest reading that book first.

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Utah Blaine

Seriously flawed - probably not the best investment in time

Reviewed in the United States on November 26, 2008

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Before I throw Col. Leonhard under the bus, I should make it clear that I've never served in the military in any capacity. It may well be that there is a great deal more to what Col. Leonhard writes that would be self-evident to a serving officer (in terms of background and world view) that I'm missing due to my lack of background. In my own discipline (physics), anyone can pick up a volume of the Landau and Lifschitz series and read through it, but I can guarantee that you aren't going to appreciate all the subtleties without dedicating a lifetime of study and experience to the field. I approached this book as an interested, reasonably well-read non-specialist who has read a great deal of Bill Lind's writings online, read about the Gulf War (e.g. Col. Summers account), the 2003 invasion of Iraq, etc. and I wanted to learn in detail what the experts view of maneuver war is and how it is different from the doctrine that Lind calls 2nd generation warfare.

In short (and with the above caveats in mind), this work can only be characterized as a huge disappointment. There are, in my view, two fatal flaws in this work. First, at least half the text is taken up with Col. Leonhard's personal rantings about shortcomings in Army training, doctrine, AirLand battle, etc. In particular, he repeatedly rants about AirLand battle doctrine is flawed. By the 27th time he states this, I think the reader gets the picture. One of the other reviewers states that this book is a tough read, but contains a great deal of info. I agree with this assessment, but it is a tough read because it it poorly written. The prose could have been tightened up, and more than half the discussion in the book removed as irrelevant.

Second, his conclusions often contradict his general thesis, or in several cases his conclusions really leave more questions than answers. He spends several hundred pages pointing out the flaws in the (then current - published in 1991) US Army Airland Battle, then as a case study talks about the invasion of Panama in 1989 and describes it as a great success for maneuver warfare. As an example of the latter phenomenon (answers versus questions), he goes to great length to explain the historical development of AirLand battle and how it was a response to the Soviet threat to Western Europe. He then rails about the flaws of the AirLand battle (and attrition warfare in general) and the superiorities of maneuver warfare, but then he never addresses the fundamental issue of how NATO should stop a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe within the maneuver warfare paradigm. He never proposes an alternative to the AirLand battle, only criticizes it because it veers from the maneuver warfare paradigm. He vaguely alludes to some type of offensive, pre-emptive action, but I'm not sure how successful this would have been against the huge Warsaw Pact army. In the end, Leonhard left me with the impression that the AirLand battle paradigm was probably the right one and that his rantings about maneuver warfare are greatly overblown.

The bottom line is that there is some good info in this book (hence the three stars), but it really isn't that well written or detailed in spite of some of the glowing reviews. I can't really recommend that anyone take the time to read it. Everything that I learned from this book can be discerned in about 10 minutes by reading the Wikipedia entry on maneuver warfare. I'm going to get Bill Lind's book and perhaps look around for some additional references to broaden my knowledge. This book is a real disappointment.

13 people found this helpful

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Donald H. Sabathier

Solid Book

Reviewed in the United States on December 26, 2013

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This is not a new book covering new ground. For those of us who were in the Army or Marines and went through Officer Advance Courses or Command & General Staff and Infantry or Armor maneuver tactics, this is normal stuff. That being said, it is a good book. Don't expect to blast through it. It is not a rousing story of men in combat. Think about what you are reading as you go through the book and try to apply the principles to your present circumstances. It is worth the time and effort.

One person found this helpful

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Glaudrung

Important to anyone interested in real world military strategy.

Reviewed in the United States on April 26, 2017

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Reveals some of deep problems with our military, showing how social conventions and ego have more impact on professional military organizations than anything else. And although Leonhard doesn't say so directly he implies through his own experiences that these problem continue because most military practitioners cannot imagine anything other way of operating.

I am at the moment a private in the Army, and if I could I would build on what Leonhard has to say. But for now I simply recommend this book.

One person found this helpful

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BB Sanders

Best starter read in maneuver warfare

Reviewed in the United States on June 13, 2021

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This book is an excellent and engaging read for anyone interested in maneuver warfare.

Reviewed in the United States on February 23, 2013

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It is a very good book to understand the maneuver warfare. The author describes it from the basic history to its application on the US Army. Recommend you to read this book.

Reviewed in the United States on November 15, 2010

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Excellent fresh view of maneuver warfare theory!

Leonhard found well the main principles of maneuver warfare. This material is very usefull when you are studying the maneuver warfare theories. You can compare Leonhard's theory with (Boyd, Fuller, Creveld, Lind)theories and find similarities and totally fresh ideas! I will warmly recommend this book for studying man warfare!
Waiting for man warfare theory to naval warfare reserch...

Toni

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Top reviews from other countries

António Marques

Five Stars

Reviewed in the United Kingdom on April 4, 2015

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I recommend for a professional Reading.

Matt plenty

Fantastic!

Reviewed in Australia on October 22, 2018

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I could call this a modern argument in validation of Sun Tsu, applied to modern military concepts; it really does provide insights into US doctrine and methods of war, and what they should be.

Kei

Explains well

Reviewed in Japan on February 26, 2022

Verified Purchase

Maneuver warfare is nothing new but this book explains well. I like his latter book only because based on timeline, this book focuses on flaws that US military force has but was not conclusive about the solution. That comes with his latter two books which are eye openers.

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