Customer Review

Reviewed in the United States on December 16, 2018
Don't waste your time or money on this book.
This book is bad. It is filled with inaccurate information, and to be candid, bad ideas.
The author demonstrates ignorance of tactics, operations, and strategy throughout the book.
The book is poorly researched, and consistently demonstrates mediocre writing of a lazy mind.

-The author disregards, and then dismisses the operational level of war. He talks of the operational art, but insists there is nothing between the tactical and the strategic levels. While true 2500 years ago, this is not true today.
-The author misrepresents doctrine in multiple parts of the book. At one point the author suggests that the joint principles are of little use to the tactician. I don't buy that statement.
-Reading this book, it is clear that the author does not understand the historic or current concepts of the Center of Gravity. Linking to his dismissal of an operational level of war, he does not mention mention or discuss operational COGs, but insists on tactical COGs. It becomes clear in his writing that he had never seen plans where the strategic or operational COGs shift dependent upon what phase one side is in, something that is common in most plans. Moreover, the author misrepresents doctrine by asserting that our doctrine insists that the COG is "the enemy's fighting force." While this is used as an example, doctrine does not specify what the COG is, planners do so in the operational design phase of planning.
The author asserts CALL was created in response to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. CALL stood up in 1985
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